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Brian C. Crocker*

Apportionment of Liability and
the Intentional Torts: The
Time is Right for Change

I. Introduction
In a tort action based solely on the Defendant's wrongful intentional
conduct, both parties have been, until recently, at a decided
disadvantage. There could be no apportionment of liability between
the Plaintiff and Defendant. Fault concepts were seen in absolute
terms. Either the Defendant was totally liable for the damages or he
was not liable at all. Principles of apportionment of liability
generally were not seen as applicable to the intentional torts. Thus,
a Plaintiff's contributory fault was irrelevant in determining the
Defendant's liability. Likewise, provocation was not a 'defence'
and did not, in all jurisdictions, always reduce compensatory
damages. Similarly for a Plaintiff the spectre was total success or
total failure. The defences of consent and self-defence were
absolute with no loss-sharing. Thus, the law had developed a simple
proposition: either a Plaintiff or Defendant, but never both, were
liable for injuries sustained.
Although this proposition was simple, it was also simplistic.
Recently it has been challenged in the Courts in Bell Canada v.
Cope (Sarnia) Ltd. I and suggestions of changing attitudes have
been given in other decisions. In addition, proposals for legislative
reform have emanated from a variety of sources that call for
apportionment in the intentional torts based on current concepts of
fault and fairness.
The purpose of this brief comment is to examine attitudes towards
apportionment of liability in the context of the intentional torts and
to examine the advisability or lack thereof for change. The first
section will deal with a brief historical perspective of apportionment
in negligence law and the changes that were effected thereto. Since
many of these changes are appropriate to apportionment in the
intentional torts they will, hopefully, "set the scene" for the second
section that deals with the major thesis of this comment - namely,
*Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School.
1. (1981), 15 C.C.L.T. 190 (Ont. C.A.); aff,g. (1980), 11 C.C.L.T. 170 (Ont.
(H.C.).
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that apportionment principles should also be applicable to the
intentionaltorts and, indeed, might now be so.
II. Apportionment and Negligence
The common law approach to liability in negligence initially was an
all-or-nothing approach. Fault was seen as a black and white issue
and if the Plaintiff, however slightly, had negligently caused or
contributed to his own injuries then the Defendant escaped liability.
Lord Blackburn stated that "The rule of law is that if there is blame
causing the accident on both sides, however small that blame may
be on one side, the loss lies where it falls." 2 The origins for this rule
might be found in the classical but now discredited legal tradition
that individuals were considered capable of protecting themselves
from injury and the law didn't exist to protect those who failed to
protect themselves. Or perhaps the rule can be explained by
reference to developing legal concepts of 'fault' and 'causation' that
were not yet fully matured. Whatever the reason for it, the patent
inequity of this rule of law was recognized by the Courts and
severely criticized. In 1923 Mr. Justice Mignault stated:
If I may say so, the doctrine of the civil law, in force in the
province of Qu6bec and also adopted in admiralty matters, is
much more equitable, for where there is common fault 3the
liability of each party is measured by his degree of culpability.
He was content, however, to leave the inequities "for the
consideration of the law-maker, for the Courts are obliged to apply
the law however harsh it may seem"

.4

The Courts, recognizing that

inequities existed, made some indirect attempts to effect change.
The doctrine of "last clear chance" apparently was a judicial
attempt to reduce the harsh common law effect of a Plaintiff's
contributory negligence and, although it "usually worked rough
justice",5 the doctrine was not without difficulties in application
and numerous exceptions to it were developed. Occasionally the
Courts would give partial relief from the harsh effects of the rule to
a Plaintiff who had contributed to his own injuries by refusing to
award costs to a successful Defendant. For instance, in Black v.
2. Cayzer, Irvine & Co. v. Canon Company, (1884) 9 A.C. 873 at 881 (H.L.).
3. GrandTrunk Pacific Railway Co. v. F. J. Earl, [ 1923] S.C.R. 397 at 408.
4. Id.
5. Williams, Glanville L., Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (London:
Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1951) at 224.
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City of Calgary Walsh, J. noted that:
It is because of what I consider the injustice of the law in this
regard that I withhold its costs from the successful defendant so
that it may not6entirely escape liability for what I have held to be
its negligence.
Thus, it would appear that even the common law was not
'without fault' in the treatment afforded liability but, fortunately,
legislative reform was forthcoming.
Since the Courts were not prepared to effect changes in the
acknowledged inequitable rule that different degrees of fault
between a Plaintiff and Defendant was not possible, the legislators
took up the gauntlet thrown by the Courts. In a reaction that was
perhaps uncharacteristic, Canada proved to be in the forefront of
positive common law reform. Adopting the then recently revised
Admiralty rule of proportionate division of liability, Ontario in 1924
became the first common law jurisdiction to apply apportionment
legislation to causes of action arising other than at sea. 7 Three other
provinces quickly followed with legislation 8 that is remarkably
similar in wording and effect. Essentially the apportionment
provisions in these latter three provinces provided as follows:
Where by the fault of two or more persons damage or loss is
caused to one or more of them, the liability to make good the
damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in which each
person was at fault:
Provided that:
(a) If, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not
possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall
be apportioned equally, and
(b) Nothing in this section shall operate so as to render any person
liable for any loss or damage to which his fault has not
contributed. 9
The Ontario legislation was slightly different in that apportionment was not based exclusively on "fault" concepts as in British
Columbia, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia but rather referred to
the concepts of contributory "fault or negligence" as if negligence
was not totally encompassed by the word "fault". The initial
6.
7.
8.
9.

(1915), 24 D.L.R. 55 at 60 (Alta. S.C.).
The Contributory Negligence Act, Stats. Ont. 1924, C. 32.
Stats. B.C. 1925, C. 8; Stats. N.S. 1926, C. 3; Stats. N.B. 1927, C. 143.
Stats. B.C. 1925, C. 8 S. 2.
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legislation has remained largely unchanged so that today in seven of
the nine common law Provinces' 0 the apportionment legislation
refers exclusively to "fault" as being the basis for apportionment.
In Ontario the present apportionment legislation continues to refer
to "fault or negligence" as the basis for apportionment"' while
Manitoba alone curiously refers to "negligence" as the sole basis
for apportionment. 12
While this difference in wording in the extant apportionment
legislation might seem relatively insignificant, the concept of
"fault" is of fundamental importance as to whether apportionment
is available to the intentional torts since the Courts have looked to
the interpretation of "fault" in concluding whether it includes
actions other than negligence. Clearly the Courts have stated that
the legislation provides apportionment in negligence actions
whatever the wording employed. Equally clearly, the Manitoba
legislation cannot apply to intentionally caused torts since
apportionment is stated as possible only in a negligence action. 13
What has been also clear, until recently, is that the Courts were not
prepared to hold that the apportionment legislation applied to
anything other than a negligence action.
14
III. Apportionment and the IntentionalTorts
(i) PreliminaryTreatment in the Courts:
In the context of the intentional torts the issue of apportionment

10. British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia,
Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.
11. Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1970, C. 296, s. 4 that states:
In any action for damages that is founded upon the fault or negligence of the
defendant if fault or negligence is found on the part of the plaintiff that
contributed to the damages, the court shall apportion the damages in proportion
to the degree of fault or negligence found against the parties respectively.
12. Tortfeasors and Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.M. 1970, C. T 90, S. 4(1)
states:
Contributory negligence by a plaintiff is not a bar to the recovery of damages by
him and in any action for damages that is founded upon the negligence of the
defendant, if negligence is found on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to
the damages, the court shall apportion the damages in proportion to the degree
of negligence found against the plaintiff and defendant respectively.
13. Id. it must be noted, however, that where the intentional tort has been
committed negligently the legislation might well be appropriate. For further
discussion refer infra s.1II(ii)(b).
14. The term "intentional torts" is a misnomer since it can include liability for
negligent acts that happen to cause direct damage. Nor is the term without difficulty
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becomes important to a Defendant who wants to raise the conduct of
the Plaintiff as a defence. The conduct of a Plaintiff who has
consented or has acted so as to cause the Defendant to react in
self-defence is relevant since the Plaintiff's conduct in these cases
totally relieve the Defendants from iability. Why then should the
contributory fault of the Plaintiff not also be a defence available to a
Defendant to at least reduce the damages payable to represent a fair
distribution between the Plaintiff and Defendant of the contributing
causes of the damage?
In Canada one of the major stumbling blocks has been a series of
cases culminating in the decision in Hollebone v. Barnard.15 The
Plaintiff was struck by a golf ball hit by the Defendant. The jury
found that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to
maintain a proper lookout and that the Defendant was also equally
negligent. The difficulty for the Defendant who wanted to use the
Plaintiff's own negligence to apportion the damages arose from the
fact that the Plaintiff had pleaded the case in trespass to the person
rather than in negligence. Using the uniquely Canadian anomaly of
Cook v. Lewis' 6 the court found that the case was properly one
involving the direct application of force and thus an intentional tort
rather than a negligence action. The issue then facing the Court was
whether the apportionment provisions contained in the Negligence
Act 17 applied to the trespass to the person action before the court.
The relevant section of the Act relied on by the Defendant stated
that:
In any action foy damages Which is fo~wadtd ,piOn the fault <.r
negligence of the defendant if fault or negligence is found on the
part of the plaintiff which contributed to the damages, the court
shall apportion the damages in proportion to the degree
of fault or
18
negligence found against the parties respectively.

because there is no unanimity as to what torts, if any, constitute the intentional torts
nor is there consensus that torts other than negligence fit neatly into one or more
separate categories such as the "intentional torts". The term, however, is used
colloquially and in that sense is also employed herein to include assault and battery
(trespass to the person), false imprisonment, intentional infliction of mental
suffering, etc. The vagueness of this description is acknowledged and intended.
15. [1954] 2 D.L.R. 278, 11954] O.R. 236 (Ont. H.C.) (hereinafter referred to as
Hollebone).
16. [1951] S.C.R. 830, [1952] 1 D.L.R. I (hereinafter referred to as Cook v.
Lewis).

17. R.S.O. 1950 C. 252.
18. Id., s. 4.

Apportionment of Liability and the Intentional Torts: 177

The Defendant argued that the trespass action was one founded
upon "fault" if not negligence and, accordingly, apportionment
should prevail. The Plaintiff's arguement was that "fault" as used
in the Act did not encompass trespass actions and that therefore the
Plaintiff's contributory negligence was only relevant if it was a
common-law defence which it was not.
In examining the word "fault" the Court rejected the authorities
that suggested that "fault" included trespass to the person. Among
these authorities was the statement by Sidney Smith J.A. that he
was "of opinion therefore that trespass to the person, like trespass
to a ship, must be deemed to be "fault" within the provisions of the
Contributory Negligence Act and whether such trespass was the
result of negligence or wilfulness."' 19 The Supreme Court of
Canada had itself left Mr. Justice Smith's statement an open issue
when Mr. Justice Estey stated "there can be no question but that the
word "fault" includes negligence, but whether it is a somewhat
wider term as used in the British Columbia Act, in my view it is not
necessary here to determine. "20 In Hollebone Mr. Justice Wells
stated at p. 283, "if there were no authority on the matter in
Ontario, the reasoning of Sidney Smith J.A., which was left open in
the Supreme Court of Canada, would commend itself to me." His
examination of the Ontario authorities, however, convinced him
that a restrictive view of the word "fault" should be taken. He was
largely influenced by three decisions of Riddell J. made in 192521
immediately after the passage of the first apportionment legislation.
Typical of Riddell J.'s restrictive view are the following statements:
The statute was intended simply for the relief of a plaintiff who
would have failed in obtaining any damages at all under the
existing law, it being proven that he was guilty of contributory
negligence. That that was the whole object of the statute I have
22
no doubt, and it should not be extended.
and
I think that statute was intended in ease of the plaintiff who was
found guilty
of contributory negligence, and not of the
23
defendant.
19. Yule v. Parmley and Parmley, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 316 at 330 (B.C. C.A.). It
should be noted that Sidney Smith J.A. was dissenting in part.
20. Parmleyand Parmley v. Yule, [1945] S.C.R. 635 at 650.
21. Walker v. Forbes, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 725 (Ont. H.C.);Farberv. T.T.C., [1925]
2 D.L.R. 729 (Ont. H.C.);Mondorv. Luchini, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 746 (Ont. H.C.).
22. Supra, note 21, Farberv. T.T.C. at 731-732.
23. Supra, note 21, Mondor v. Luchini at 747.
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In Hollebone, Wells J. felt that he was bound by the Ontario
restrictive view and reluctantly concluded "that the words 'fault'
and 'negligence' in the Ontario statutes are synonymous and simply
mean negligence, and should not receive any wider meaning than
that which is included in the word 'negligence"' .2 Accordingly,
since the Defendant had committed a trespass to the person, even
though not intentionally, the Court found him totally liable for the
damages since the contributory negligence of the Plaintiff was not a
defence available to the Defendant.
The decision in Hollebone is a curious one that appears to be
based on a slavish reliance on precedence and on the fiction of the
presumed intention of the Legislation. By limiting apportionment to
actions of negligence and none other it extended the influence of the
old writ system that had been eliminated to address the evil of the
'proper cause of action'. It expanded the effect of Cook v. Lewis
and allowed an injustice to be encouraged by the Courts. Both
parties were an effective and equal cause of the damages. This fact
was acknowledged by the Court but it forced one party to pay for
damages contributed to by another. The decision ignored the fact
that the 'intentional' tort of trespass to the person could be
committed intentionally or negligently. Perhaps the decision might
have been appropriate if the Defendant had intentionally struck the
Plaintiff but he did not. The Defendant was negligent. So was the
Plaintiff. Both were to blame. On a reasonable interpretation of the
legislation the Court could have apportioned the damages but it
refused to do so. Thus, all that a negligent Plaintiff would have to
do to make his own negligence irrelevant was to properly frame his
action in trespass rather than in negligence, the only difference
being that trespass involves direct damage whereas negligence does
not necesarily require directness. Although the Hollebone decision
has been criticized, it has been followed in a number of subsequent
decisions 25 and ensured that apportionment was limited to
negligence actions until very recently.
(ii) Reasons for and Against Apportionment in the Intentional
Torts.
Before turning to recent decisions that challenge Hollebone some
24. Supra, note 15 at 286.
25. See StandardInternationalCorporationet al. v. Morgan et al., [1967] 1 O.R.
328 (S.C.); Acker v. Acker (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 270 (Co. Ct.); Chesnesky v.
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analysis of the various justifications for or against extension of
apportioment principles to the intentional torts is appropriate.
(a) Is there anything inherent in the conduct of Defendant that
should prevent apportionment? It must be remembered that many of
the intentional torts can only be committed by intentional conduct of
the Defendant. In many instances this will include a definite intent
to harm the Plaintiff although this is not necessary. Certainly the
common law had a particular abhorrence for acts done by a
Defendant with intent to injure. As well as branding many of these
acts crimes, the law imposed absolute liability on the wrongdoing
Defendant. The rationalization for this was articulated by Glanville
Williams in his classic work on contributory negligence thusly:
This exclusion of the defence in cases of intentional wrongdoing
rests partly on ideas of policy; it is a penal provision aimed at
repressing conduct flagrantly wrongful. Also, it is a result of the
ordinary human feeling that the defendant's wrongful intention so
outweighs 2the
plaintiff's wrongful negligence as to efface it
6
altogether.
Not everyone, however, agrees that a Defendant should
necessarily pay for the totality of damages where there is intent to
injure. The following example is representative:
The first question is whether contributory fault should be a
defence available in all tort actions. We see no reason to exclude
any torts. The courts assess fault and the degree to which the fault
of each person contributes to the damage; and if the wrong-doer
intentionally committed the wrong he will get short shrift on a
plea that the injured party did not take active enough steps to
avoid the wrongful act. On the other hand, there may be a case,
e.g., a fight entered into deliberately by both persons,
in which
27
an apportionment would be the only fair adjudication.
In most instances of intentional harm, clearly, apportionment will
be inappropriate. That should surely not mean, however, that it is
inappropriate to all cases and that Courts must never consider the
circumstances including the Plaintiff's conduct.
If the Defendant acted intentionaly but with no intent to produce
the resulting injuries then it might not be inappropriate in some
cases to consider the Plaintiff's conduct and apportion the damages
accordingly. In Bettel v. Yim 2 8 the 15 year old Plaintiff threw a
Arrdale PublishersLtd. et al., [1974] 6 W.W.R. 162 (Sask. C.A.).

26. Supra, note 5 at 198.
27. 1979 Proceedings, Uniform Law Conference of Canada, at 105.

28. (1978), 5 C.C.L.T. 66 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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lighted match into the Defendant's store causing a fire. The
Defendant's subsequent intentional shaking of the Plaintiff resulted
in an unintended nose injury for which the Plaintiff sued. In his
annotation to the case, Lewis Klar makes the following comment:
This issue of contributory negligence as a defence in an
intentional tort was not raised in the instant case. The point
however is an interesting one. It has been held that contributory
negligence is not a defence to intentional torts - Hollebone v.
Barnard, [1954] O.R. 236, [1954] 2 D.L.R. 278. The issue
however has scarcely been raised since 1954 and with the
increased popularity of apportionment as a method of ensuring
fairness it might be argued that the matter ought to be rethought.
In the instant case, for example, one might suggest that the
unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff contributed to his eventual
injuries and that he should have been responsible for part of these
damages. Again the argument is a moralistic one. Should an
intentional wyongdoez be yelieied of any pa t of the cmoequences
brought about by his wrongdoing? I would again submit that
there is nothing necessarily reprehensible about the conduct of an
intentional tortfeasor and that in the appropriate circumstance
contributory negligence ought to be considered. This case might
where apportionment would have been
have been a good example
29
the appropriate device.
If the Defendant's conduct was negligent this still might result in
his commission of an intentional tort because of the anachronistic
rule in Cook v. Lewis that established the concept of negligent
trespass. Indeed, this was the Defendant's conduct in Hollebone and
it could not reasonably be said that the Defendant's conduct there
was any more reprehensible than the Plaintiff's since the Jury found
both parties equally negligent for essentially the same reasons. Why
then should the conduct of the Plaintiff receive different and
unequal treatment when compared to the Defendant's conduct?
Simply because the damage was 'direct' is surely irrelevant to the
nature of the conduct being examined. To prohibit apportionment in
cases involving negligent trespass is to extend the scope of Cook v.
Lewis and give the Plaintiff more than a mere procedural advantage.
Any lay person would surely cry out 'foul' and the Courts, too,
should not be blinded to abundantly clear unfairness. By refusing to
recognize more than one cause of the damage and by re~strictivey
looking at the form of action rather than the nature of the conduct
the Courts succeed in frustrating an equitable application of
29. Id., at 69.
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apportionment principles.
(b) Is there anything contained in the current legislation that
prevents apportionment in the intentional torts? None of the
Canadian statutes specifically prohibit apportionment in the
intentional torts. The Manitoba legislation 3Orequires apportionment
in actions "founded upon the negligence of the defendant" and
since tort actions based on the intentional conduct of the Defendant
are not within this concept then presumably the Plaintiffs
contributory negligence is not relevant to apportionment unless it
arises out of common law principles. There would be nothing,
however, in the Manitoba statute to prevent apportionment to cases
of negligent trespass since in such instances the Defendant can
frequently prove the absence of intention but not of negligence.
Thus, in such a case the only basis for the action is the negligence of
the Defendant. Granted, it could be argued that the negligent
trespass case in "founded" on the nature of the Plaintiffs injury
(i.e., a result of a direct applition of force) rather than on the nature
of the Defendant's conduct (i.e., intentional or negligent) but this
leads to an unnecessary and unfortunate interpretation of the
legislation.
All of the other Provinces' statutes base apportionment on
"fault" or "fault or negligence". Hollebone interprets the word
"fault" as being limited to what was intended by the legislators
when they passed the apportionment Acts. This legal fiction of the
intention of the legislators focuses exclusively on the elimination of
the common law principle that a negligent Defendant could escape
liability completely if the Plaintiff had contributed to his injury.
Clearly the act was intended to benefit Plaintiffs who were
otherwise faced with the "all or nothing" rule. But if the Acts can
be reasonably interpreted to achieve fairness in other areas what is
there to prevent this? Legislation frequently achieves results that
could not have been intended by its makers. It is the words that are
'cast in stone' not the intentions. As stated by one study:
When the defence of contributory negligence is regarded as one
founded upon achieving fairness as between plaintiff and
defendant and not one which merely corrects a defect of the
common law for the advantage of a plaintiff, it ceases to be
relevant to inquire whether at common law the plaintiff's own
failure of care was either a complete defence or no defence at all.
Consequently we think that there is no reason to confine the
30. Supra, note 12.
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partial defence of contributory negligence to actions which are
framed in negligence. . . . We would suggest that the difficulty
in ascertaining the scope of the defence of contributory
negligence has stemmed from a conflict between treating the
relevant statute as one intended solely to correct a defect in the
common law for the advantage of the plaintiff and as one
intended to achieve fairness between a plaintiff and a defendant.
If the broader rationale for the defence of contributory
negligence, to achieve fairness between plaintiff and defendant,
is accepted, the defence cannot be restricted to certain categories
of torts. 3 1
If the Courts can achieve two different results depending on their
interpretation of legislation - one that will result is equal treatment
of the parties and full consideration of all the circumstances and one
that results in patent unfairness and blindness to the facts - why
should the latter choice be the one that prevails?
(c) Is there anything in the common law that prevents
apportionment in the intentional torts? The following conclusions
that there might be common law principles preventing apportionment in the intentional torts must be prefaced with the obvious
comment that the current legislation can change prior common law
and make any discussion thereof irrelevant.
It is fairly clear that contributory negligence of a Plaintiff was not
a defence open to a Defendant in an action involving intended
injury, if not all the intentional torts. As stated by Wells J in
Hollebone at p. 286, "I am not aware that a plea of contributory
negligence was ever a defence to an action of trespass and no
authorities to show that it was have been cited to me nor have I been
able to find any". Thus, any basis for consideration of a Plaintiff's
contributory negligence in the intentional torts must come from the
legislation and interpretations thereof since there is no judicial
precedent therefor.
In the common law, however, there is the concept that some of
the intentional torts such as battery are actionable per se. The
reasons for this per se concept are perhaps historical and based on
the societal and moralistic perception of the need for the protection
of personal and proprietary interests whereby the very nature of the
offence gave rise to a presumption of damage. Whether such
31. Report No. 31; Contributory Negligence and Concurrent Wrongdoers,
University of Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform at 14.

32. Supra, note 15 at 286.
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concepts are of much relevance today can certainly be challenged
the fact remains that they are still part of our law. The per se
concept would not realistically prevent apportionment. In the
absence of any substantive damages a Plaintiff will normally not
commence an action because the damages awarded will be nominal
only and the action might be dismissed as frivolous or costs will be
awarded against the successful Plaintiff. In a successful per se
action the Plaintiff normally will be entitled to nominal damages
and actual damages. Apportionment does not reduce the entitlement
of a Plaintiff to either type of damage but it does reduce the quantum
entitlement. Since a Plaintiff's conduct under apportionment
legislation does not constitute an absolute defence, the per se
concepts intrinsically attached to those few applicable torts are not
affected. If a Court felt compelled to leave the per se concept
completely intact there would be nothing preventing an untouched
award of nominal damages together with an apportioned award of
actual damages.
In awarding damages there has been a lot of judicial concern and
confusion surrounding the principle that the Plaintiff should receive
adequate and complete compensation for the injuries sustained.
Especially in the area of the effect of provocation on a damage
award is this confusion most obvious. In England, Lane v.
Holloway3 3 sets forth the proposition that "when considering what
damages a plaintiff is entitled to as compensation for physical
injury, the fact that the plaintiff may have behaved badly is
irrelevant.'' 34 The case is further authority for the rule that
provocation can only be taken into account to reduce punitive or
exemplary damages but not compensatory damages. In Canada
there has been no uniform acceptance or rejection of the Lane v.
Holloway principles. While most Courts appear to have embraced
the principle, 3 5 a few reject it making statements such as the
following:
Canadian Courts have had no difficulty in lumping the damages
together and substracting a portion, or percentage where they
have found provocation to be a mitigating factor. A clear basis
for this can be found in the fact that in provoking an assault and
battery, the Plaintiff can be considered to have contributed to his
33. [1968] 1Q.B. 379 (C.A.).
34. Id., at 392.
35. See Check v. Andrews Hotel Co. Ltd., (1974), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 364 (Man.
C.A.);Landry v. Patterson(1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 345 (Ont. C.A.)
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own damages. He is, in this respect, part of their cause...36
The relevancy of the foregoing discussion on provocation to
apportionment in the intentional torts depends on whether the
Courts will view provoking conduct as a contributing cause of the
damages. If provocation by a Plaintiff is considered to be a
contributing cause to the damages then in those jurisdictions that
have followed Lane v. Holloway there might well be a conflict if
apportionment is also available. The conflict is that provocation
cannot reduce compensatory damages but apportionment can.
Which rule of law should prevail?
The issue is far from an academic one. In a subsequent decision
the English Court of Appeal that decided Lane v. Holloway stated
that the Lane case was one "where the conduct of the injured man
was trivial" 37 and made the following comments on the Lane
principles:
I do not think they can or should be applied where the injured
man, by his own conduct, can fairly be regarded as partly
responsible for the damage he suffered. So far as general
principle is concerned, I would like to repeat what I said in the
later case of Gray v. Burr [1971] 2 All E.R. 949 at 957:
In an action for assault, in awarding damages, the judge or
jury can take into account, not only circumstances which go to
aggravate damages, but also those which go to mitigate
them.'38

This possible conflict between the two rules of law should, it is
submitted, be resolved in favour of apportionment principles. Since
apportionment is concerned with a fair and equitable distribution of
liability amongst the respective causes of the damages, then, if the
Plaintiff's provocation can be reasonably said to be one of the
contributing causes, this should be taken into account to apportion
the award the Plaintiff receives. Otherwise he is reaping the benefit
of his own wrongdoing at the expense of the Defendant.
If, on the other hand, the provocation cannot reasonably be said
to &e a contributing cause then apportionment would be inapplicable
and the Courts could continue to apply their varied rules on the
effect of provocation. Whether the conduct of the Plaintiff amounts
to 'mere provocation' or 'causal provocation' would have to be a
36. Mason v. Sears and Cruikshank, March 26, 1979 C.H. 26808 (N.S. Co. Ct.)
(Unreported).
37. Murphy v. Culhane, [1976] 3 All E.R. 533 (C.A.) at 535.
38. Id.
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decision left to the discretion of the trier of fact since causation is a
matter of fact.
(d) Is there anything inherent in the conduct or situation of the
Plaintiff that should prevent apportionment? The fact that the
Plaintiff has suffered damages is, by itself, no reason to deny
apportionment since proportionate division of liability is already
imposed on an injured Plaintiff in negligence actions. Thus there
appears to be nothing intrinsic in the injury that prevents the
principles of proportionate liability.
When the Plaintiff's conduct is examined there appears to be
nothing inherent in that which would deny apportionment. Since
apportionment of damages is concerned with causal conduct only,
then if the Plaintiff has contributed to his own injuries, why should
the Defendant pay for damages beyond his proportionate responsibility? The Hollebone case could lead to the ludicrous situation
where the Plaintiff had contributorily caused 90% of his own
injuries and the Defendant contributorily caused 10% and yet the
Defendant would have to pay 100% because the injury arose from a
direct application of force. Could it be said that in such a situation
the plaintiff is deserving of such treatment or that the Defendant's
conduct was much more reprehensible than the Plaintiff's? To
require payment of all the damages by the Defendant is to punish the
Defendant for no just cause. It has long been a "common law
principle that a person cannot derive any advantage from his own
wrong" 3 9 and yet there is exactly what is achieved by denying
apportionment in the intentional torts.
(iii) Recent Treatment in the Courts
Recently Courts have taken a second look at apportionment in cases
involving actions other than negligence and appear ready to expand
the scope of the legislation. For example, Chief Justice MacKeigan
has acknowledged that fault concepts are not confined exclusively
to negligence and can apply to actions involving breach of contract.
In concluding that the Nova Scotia Contributory Negligence Act 40
applies to a breach of contract action he states "I have little doubt
that the Nova Scotia Act applies where loss is caused by any
"fault"; the word "tort" does not appear",*41 A fortiori the
39. Ginty v. Belmont Building Supplies, Ltd., [1959] 1 All E.R. 414 (Q.B.C.) at
424.
40. R.S.N.S. 1967 c. 54.
41. Speed andSpeed Ltd. v. FinanceAmerica Realty Ltd., (1979), 12 C.C.L.T. 4
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apportionment legislation would also apply to an intentional tort
action if the Plaintiff's conduct can be considered to be "fault".
By far the most important case that addresses this issue directly2
vis h vis the intentional torts is Bell Canadav. Cope (Sarnia)Ltd. 4
The Defendants wore sued for both trespass an6 negYigence for
damages caused by them in the destruction of a live telephone cable.
The Defendants had been induced to act as they did by the
negligence of the Plaintiff and the Court found the proper split of
responsibility would be two-thirds against the Plaintiff and one-third
against the Defendant.
It is interesting to note that Linden J. in his trial decision 43 found
that the Defendant acted negligently in proceeding with the
excavation work without a "locate slip" that would have assisted in
proper location of the cable. Perhaps more importantly, he also
found that the Defendant had acted both intentionally and
negligently in cutting into a concrete pipe without confirming the
contents thereof. Thus, we have a situation where the Defendant's
conduct is intentional and negligent. The Court could have
apportioned liability without any difficulty because one of the
actions was a negligence action and as stated in Hollebone the Act
was intended to apportion a Plaintiff's contributory negligence in
such a case. Mr. Justice Linden, however, was not content to ignore
the rule decided by Hollebone and turned to the trespass action to
see whether apportionment could be made in a case that was based
on trespass as well as negligence. Examining the Ontario
apportionment legislation 44 he stated that:
Fault and negligence, as these words are used in the statute are
not the same thing. Fault certainly includes negligence, but it is
much broader than that. Fault incorporates all intentional
wrongdoing, as well as other types of substandard conduct. In
and negligent wrongdoing were
this case, both intentional
45
satisfactorily proved.
In coming to this conclusion that is contrary to the decision in
Hollebone, Linden J. cited with approval the authorities that were
rejected in the prior case. Relying partly on the Sidney Smith J.A.
statement quoted earlier, 4 6 Linden J. concludes that the word
(N.S. S.C. A.D.) at 25.
42. Supra, note 1.
43. (1980), 11 C.C.L.T. 170 (Ont. H.C.) (hereinafter referred to as Bell Canada).
44. Supra, note 11.
45. Supra, note 43 at 180.
46. Supra, note 19.
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"fault" includes trespass actions. He states:
The gist of the trespass action today is fault; if it can be
established by the defendant that there was no negligence and no
intentional interference then the action will fail because no fault
exists. Consequently, trespass is based on fault and is no longer a
strict liability cause of action. . . . I find, therefore, that a
trespass action comes
within the opening words of s. 4 of the
47
Negligence Act,
Mr. Justice Linden also rejected the authorities that were
accepted in Hollebone that suggested that the legislation was
intended to be limited only to those cases where contributory
negligence would have been an absolute defence prior to the
legislation. Without stating reasons, and labelling the reliance
thereon as "erroneous", he concluded that those "cases have no
relevance at all in the interpretation of the meaning of the words
48
"fault or negligence" in this context."
Turning to the Hollebone decision itself, Linden J. found that
Bell Canada was distinguishable since it involved both trespass and
negligence actions whereas Hollebone was based exclusively on
trespass. 4 9 Linden J. also pointed out that Hollebone was the
decision of a trial judge and, therefore, not strictly binding on him.
Linden J.'s decision was appealed to the Ontario court of
Appeal 50 and Brooke J.A. gave a very brief oral judgment
dismissing the appeal. Although the appeal decision adds little but
concurrence to Linden J.'s decision, it does represent the first
Canadian Appellate decision that is unanimous in allowing
apportionment in an action involving trespass. Perhaps even more
significantly, the Ontario Court of Appeal cited with approval
Linden J.'s conclusion that the word "fault" was a much broader concept than just negligence and included all intentional wrongdoing.
The problem with the Bell Canada decisions is that not all of the
questions relating to apportionment in the intentional torts have
been answered. Both Courts placed some weight on the fact that the
Bell Canada case involved both intentional and negligent conduct
by the Defendant and that the Plaintiff had sued for both trespass
and negligence. Indeed, this was the stated distinguishing feature
between Bell Canada and Hollebone. It might not be safe to
47.
48.
49.
50.

Supra, note 43 at 180.
Supra, note 43 at 183.
Supra, note 43 at 182.
Supra, note 1.
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conclude, therefore, that, if the Plaintiff in Bell Canada had sued
only in trespass or if the Defendant's conduct had been intentional
only, that the same conclusions would have been reached. In light
of Linden J.'s conclusions that trespass is based on fault and that the
word 'fault' in the apportionment legislation includes all intentional
wrongdoing, it is hard to imagine that the Court would not have
allowed apportionment even if the Bell Canada case exclusively
involved intentional conduct, a trespass action or any of the
intentional torts.
The Bell Canada decision is, of course, distinguishable in other
jurisdictions since the apportionment legislation in Ontario is unique
being based on the words "fault or negligence." However, the
conclusions that there can be no liability in trespass without fault
and that the word "fault" means more than negligence and includes
intentional conduct would now appear to be extremely persuasive
and equally applicable to those jurisdictions that base apportionment
on "fault" alone.
IV. Conclusion
Certainly the Bell Canada case is a step in the right direction
towards resolving a few of the many difficulties facing apportionment principles generally. Questions in addition to the scope of Bell
Canada, however, remain. Does apportionment only apply when
the Plaintiffs conduct is contributorily negligent? Can a Plaintiff
who has consented obtain any apportionment from a Defendant?
Can apportionment be made in actions, other than tort, that include
fault such as breach of contract, breach of trust? What is the
relationship of provocation and apportionment? Can a Plaintiff who
is faced with the defence of self-defence ever obtain apportionment?
What if the defendant has acted on the grounds of reasonable
mistake not induced by the Plaintiff?
If the Courts are slow in applying and expanding the Bell Canada
principles to other situations some changes will likely occur through
legislative reform. Significant revisions have been recommended 51
and are under consideration. 52 The sole apparent reason for wanting
51. Supra, note31.
52. Supra, note 27. Although it is believed that the 1980 Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada recommended a Uniform
Apportionment Act that includes apportionment for the intentional torts, this has
not been confirmed. The proceedings of the Conference were not available as of the
date of the writing of this comment in July 1981.
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any change at all in the application of apportionment principles is a
reason that is difficult to explain - fairness. Perhaps it is simply
intuitional if one concludes that Hollebone achieves an unfair result
and Bell Canada achieves fairness. Hopefully it is more-concern
that a court can ignore the facts of the case; concern that a court
looks at one parties' conduct only; concern that a court would let a
party benefit from his own "wrong"; concern that the parties have
not been given fair and equal treatment. Fairness must be this and
more. If apportionment in the intentional torts can achieve an equal
and reasonable treatment of the parties, a full consideration of the
contributory causes and an equitable distribution of proportionate
responsibility then fairness, whether intuitional or otherwise, will
have been achieved. Bell Canada starts this process. It will be
interesting to see where it ends.

